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Thank you for the opportunity to include myself, as well as
Choice in Dying, in part of what I hope will be an ongoing, con-
tinuing discussion regarding the issue of physician-assisted sui-
cide.
Choice in Dying is a national, not-for-profit organization.1 We
are in a unique position in that it is our mission, as the oldest
and only national organization devoted solely to a broad range of
end of life issues, to secure the right of patients to make deci-
sions about their end of life medical care and to promote quality
care for dying patients. 2
Now, the organization's work includes a professionally staffed
national hotline where we respond to approximately three to five
thousand individuals each month, requesting facts and counsel-
B.A. (Psychology) State University of New York at Albany; J.D., Hofstra University
School of Law. Ms. Sieger is the Staff Attorney at Choice in Dying and has professional
training and experience in elder law and healthcare. Prior to her appointment at Choice
in Dying, Ms. Sieger was an associate at Russo & Atlas, an elder care law firm, where
she consulted clients regarding estate planning and advance directives, resolved nursing
home placement issues, appeared before administrative law judges in connection with
the denial of Medicaid benefits and handled Family Court support matters.
1 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Choice in Dying in Support of Neither the Petitioners or
the Respondents at *1, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110)
and Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858), available in 1996 WL 656277. In
1976, the Euthanasia Society of America was renamed the Society for the Right to Die,
and in 1991 again renamed Choice in Dying. Id. Choice in Dying is an organization that
is well recognized for pioneering living wills. Id. They operate a national hotline for pa-
tients and their families. Id.
2 See id. at *1 (explaining Choice in Dying's mission which is to secure right of pa-
tients to make decisions concerning effecting their end of life medical care and to pro-
mote improving quality of care dying patients receive); see also Ann Fade, Right to Die:
New Law and Policy Issues Appear While Old Ones Remain Unresolved, 11 No. 2
HEALTHSPAN 3, 5 (1994) (discussing broad range of services Choice in Dying provides in-
cluding counseling and free legal information for families and healthcare providers con-
cerning end of life decision making).
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ing. In addition, Choice in Dying also provides public, profes-
sional and physician education and we also monitor the changes
in state and federal law with regard to end of life issues.3 One of
my principal roles is crisis resolution.
Choice in Dying takes no position as far as the legality or the
constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide. 4 However, the
position that we do take is that this issue needs ongoing, com-
plete debate. As part of the continuing debate, Choice in Dying
did deem it crucial that the United States Supreme Court be
fully informed about a number of issues. Consequently, we pro-
vided the Court with an amicus brief,5 although we consider the
brief to be more informational in nature.
So, you might say we are presently taking a neutral stand as
public debate continues. Although we remain neutral in this de-
bate, Choice in Dying is still able to discuss the present contro-
versy. Presently, many factors contribute to the current contro-
versy about medical care at the end of life. 6 Current medical
technology can prevent or cure many diseases 7 and significantly
improve the quality of life for those suffering from chronic dis-
abilities. 8 That same technology, however, is being used to dis-
3 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Choice in Dying, supra note 1, at *1 (noting that in ad-
dition to patient counseling services Choice in Dying provides educational services to
physicians and monitors changes in both federal and state legislation relating to end of
life decision making).
4 See Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg and Quill Amicus Briefs: Verbatim Argu-
ments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 102 n.4 (1997) (noting Choice in
Dying's amicus brief did not take positions on physician-assisted suicide, however, or-
ganization's long standing involvement provided guidance to Court in deciding issue).
5 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Choice in Dying, supra note 1, at *1.
6 See Lakshmipathi Cherulli et al., Intensive Care for Critically Ill Elderly: Mortality,
Costs and Quality of Life, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1013, 1013 (1995) (noting that
factors such as reforms in organization and delivery of healthcare, changes in nation's
demographics contributed to controversy surrounding physician-assisted suicide); see
also John D. Lentos et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, AM. J. MED., July
1989 at 81, 82-83 (contending that disagreements among physicians concerning point at
which medical treatment becomes futile has contributed to physician-assisted suicide
controversy).
7 See Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical Technology, and the
Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 341 (1996) (noting that
improvements in medical technology have decreased death rate from diseases and raised
life expectancy); see also Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choice: Medical and Legal, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 103, 128 (1996) (contending that modern medicine has created expectation
of healthier lives).
8 See Terry Fielder, The Relief Business: Treatment Efforts Targeting Previously
Unmet Medical Needs, CHI. STAR TRIB., May 4, 1997, at 1D (discussing Medicare's new
emphasis on improving quality of life for those with chronic medical conditions); John
Morrisey, Outcomes, Chronic-Care Consortium Develops Living Tool to Help Integrate
Services, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 19, 1996, at 33 (stating that healthcare is shifting
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tort and prolong the dying process. 9
The problems raised by the misapplication of technology 10 and
the lack of accessibility to good palliative care11 are compounded
by widespread public and professional confusion or ignorance.
12
Significant gaps still exist in the available empirical evidence
concerning physician-assisted suicide. As a result, public debate
is still at a comparatively formative stage. 13 This is evident by
the fact that five years ago we might not have had this sympo-
sium.
As with any emerging body of thought and practice, there is
inherent instability which augurs both progress and risk. In or-
der to minimize the risk, Choice in Dying has felt compelled to
address and resolve several areas of confusion in our amicus
brief.14 Some of these issues have already been discussed and I
will point them out again so you understand our position.
The major point of concern is that there seems to be misinfor-
mation and misunderstanding about life sustaining treatments,
including artificial nutrition and hydration. 15 Life sustaining
toward improving quality of life of patients with chronic illnesses like diabetes, arthritis,
lung ailments, especially in elderly patients).
9 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Choice in Dying, supra note 1, at *8-10 (stating
"imposition of artificial nutrition and hydration may actually contribute to an uncomfort-
able death").
10 See, e.g., Charles R. Disalvo, Genetic Discrimination; Worshipping at the Altar of
Technique: Manic Aggressive Medicine and Law, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1365, 1378 (1995)
(stating that often times physicians place greater importance on utilization of medical
technology at expense of best interests of patients); Patricia L. Rizzo, Religion-Based Ar-
guments in the Public Arena: A Catholic Perspective on Euthanasia, Compassion in Dying
v. State of Washington and Quill v. Vacco, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTHCARE 243, 245 (1996)
(stating that in many instances, medical technology has not extended life, but "merely
lengthened dying process").
11 See Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 735,769 n.17 (1995) [hereinafter Against Assisted Suicide] (citing
John D. Arras, The Right to Die on the Slippery Slope, 8 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 285, 304
(1982)) (noting that euthanasia would be more attractive remedy for poor since they "lack
access to mainstream medical care and the amenities of the hospice"); Anthony Szczgiel,
Long Term Care Coverage: The Rule of Advocacy, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 721, 755-56 (1996)
(noting that although hospice care programs are being developed, they are "by no means
universal").
12 See Michael McCarthy, US Patients Do Not Always Get the Best End-Of-Life Care,
THE LANCET, June 14, 1997, at 1747 (contending that medical culture tolerates, and in
some cases rewards, misapplication of life sustaining technologies).
13 See Ezekial J. Emanuel & Elisabeth Daniels, Oregon's Physician-Assisted Suicide
Laws: Provisions and Problems, ARCHIVES INT. MED., Apr. 22, 1996, at 825 (asserting
that lack of adequate control group of terminally-ill patients makes it impossible to dif-
ferentiate between those who request and receive physician-assisted suicide and those
who do not).
14 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Choice in Dying, supra note 1, at *1.
15 See Maria Torrella & Carney R. Sean Morisson, Advance Directives: When, Why
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treatments include not only artificial nutrition and hydration,
but also treatment such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR),
mechanical ventilation, and kidney dialysis. 16
However, the Ninth 17 and Second 18 Circuit Courts seem to
imply, in both their opinions, that artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion were somehow qualitatively different from the other forms
of life sustaining treatment. 19 For example, both courts used
language, such as starvation, to refer to and describe artificial
nutrition and hydration. 20 In fact, there was a wonderful article
out called The Sloganism of Starvation.2 1 The problem with us-
ing the term "starvation" is it is emotion laden and it raises
frightening images of hungry, otherwise healthy people who are
prevented from obtaining desired food.22
It is important to any discussion of this issue to remember
that artificial nutrition and hydration are medical treatments. 23
Consequently, artificial nutrition and hydration should not be
distinguished from other forms of life sustaining treatment. In
and How to Start Talking, GERIATRICS, Apr. 1, 1997, at 65 (chronicling debate over life
sustaining treatments).
16 See THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT AND CARE OF THE DYING 4 (1987) (defining life-sustaining treatment as "any
medical intervention that is administered to a patient in order to forestall moment of
death); see also Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions Near the End of Life,
267 JAMA 2229, 2229 (1992) (explaining that life sustaining treatment includes
"mechanical ventilation, venal dialysis, chemotherapy, antibiotics and artificial nutrition
and hydration").
17 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.,
Glucksberg v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
18 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
19 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 829 (categorizing artificial nutrition and hydration as
different from other life sustaining treatments); Quill, 80 F.3d at 729 (discussing artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration in context of starvation).
20 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 829 (using term starvation to refer to artificial nutri-
tion); Quill, 80 F.3d at 729 (referring to artificial nutrition as starvation).
21 See Judith C. Ahronheim & M. Rose Gasner, The Sloganism of Starvation, 335 THE
LANCET 278, 315 (1990); see also Compassion, 79 F.3d at 823 (scrutinizing Cruzan argument
that once artificial means of nutrition and hydration ended, Nancy Cruzan died from delib-
erate self starvation, not underlying illness); Quill, 82 F.3d at 729 (stating "the withdrawal
of nutrition brings on death by starvation, the withdrawal of hydration brings on death by
dehydration").
22 See Stephen P. Von Derhoef, In re Grant: Where Does Washington Stand on Artifi-
cial Nutrition and Hydration, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 197, 233 (1989) (stating that
use of word "starvation" to refer to withholding of artificial nutrition conjures up emo-
tional images of people being starved).
23 See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Mo. 1988) (stating that artificial nu-
trition, as well as hydration, are medical life sustaining treatments); see also Edward R.
Grant & Cathleen A. Cleaver, A Line Less Reasonable: Cruzan and the Looming Debate
Over Active Euthanasia, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 99, 1182 (1991) (reiterating
that according to American Medical Association, artificial nutrition and hydration are
medical treatments).
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addition, there is no evidence that individuals who are depend-
ent upon artificial nutrition and hydration, whether alert and
aware, or partially or severely neurological impaired, would ex-
perience discomfort if these treatments were foregone. 24 In fact,
extensive, indirect evidence indicates that foregoing artificial nu-
trition and hydration could actually facilitate a natural death
without discomfort. 25
Another source of concern for Choice in Dying is the blurring of
the distinction between the withholding or withdrawing of life
sustaining treatment and physician-assisted suicide. 26 There
are important distinctions between the two 27 and it is critical,
from a healthcare perspective and as far as our organization is
concerned, that these distinctions be maintained. I do not want
to go through another analysis regarding informed consent, bat-
24 See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 295 (Ill. 1989) (declaring that it is
doubtful that patients in persistent vegetative state could experience pain and discomfort
from withholding artificial nutrition and hydration); Mark Strasser, Assisted Suicide and
the Competent Terminally Ill: On Aiding Treatments and Extraordinary Policies, 74 OR.
L. REV. 539, 589 (1995) (stating that some believe that death by starvation, as well as by
dehydration, may be painful but if patient is insensate, he may not feel anything). But
see Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 641 (Mass. 1986) (Lynch, J.,
dissenting) (contending that pain and suffering as result of starvation or dehydration
could be prolonged because death may take time); Robert L. Lapointe, The Removal of
Feeding Tubes: Has the Right to Die Reached Its Limits, 24 NEw ENG. L. REV. 185, 209
(1989) (stating that death by starvation and dehydration is slow, as well as uncomfort-
able).
25 See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (N.J. 1985) (recognizing that artificial nu-
trition and hydration to prolong life may be more painful or stressful than dehydration or
starvation); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 453 (Wash. 1987) (contending that it is no longer
clear that dehydration and malnourishment will always be painful to terminally ill pa-
tients); see also Nancy Dies, Outlived By Debate Over Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
1990, at 1 (stating that Nancy Cruzan's parents claimed she was peaceful throughout
removal of feeding tubes, showing no sign of discomfort).
26 See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-297 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating action-inaction distinction is irrelevant because cause of death in
both cases is patient's conscious decision to put end to own life); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d
947, 955 (Me. 1987) (stating that decision to refuse artificial life-sustaining treatment
does not constitute suicide); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 627 (Nev. 1990)
(declaring "substantial difference" between person desiring to terminate their life and
person deciding not to interfere with natural consequences of their condition); In re
Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983) (stating that death results from natural causes
when life sustaining equipment is removed).
27 See Cruzan, 497 U. S. at 280 (stating "the majority of states in this country have
laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide. We do
not think a state is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary
decision by a physically able adult to starve to death."); see also Yale Kamisar, The "Right
To Die" On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 512-13 (1996)
[hereinafter Right to Die] (questioning how rationale of Quill and Compassion in Dying to
limit physician-assisted suicide to terminally ill patients will be upheld in Supreme
Court); David Orenttiener, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest
Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 444 (1997) (distinguishing suicide assistance and treat-
ment withdrawal by arguing that only latter is morally acceptable).
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tery and the common law, however, I will just briefly discuss the
distinctions.
The foregoing of life sustaining treatment refers to the avoid-
ance of medical treatment that is necessary to sustain life. 28
Since these life sustaining treatments artificially postpone natu-
ral death, the withholding or withdrawing of these treatments
remove that obstacle to death.29 In addition, the right to with-
hold or withdraw life sustaining treatment is not limited to the
terminally-ill, nor to competent adults because limiting such a
right to terminally-ill competent patients, may be constitution-
ally impermissible. 30
Finally, as a way of contrasting analogy, another way to look
at this topic is to examine the result of a failure to comply with
an individual's wishes. If a failure to comply with the request for
withholding or withdrawing life sustaining treatment would
subject an individual to unwanted treatment, then such failure
would make him or her basically a virtual prisoner of medical
technology.3 1 The imposition of life support often involves highly
invasive equipment and procedures, and that is a more serious
interference with personal liberty. 32
28 See Amy Haddad, Ethics in Action (Ethical Questions Regarding Assisted Suicide),
RN, Mar. 1, 1997, at 17 (stating that forgoing life sustaining treatments simply means
declining intervention).
29 See Washington's Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE. § 70.122.020(4) (1985)
(defining life sustaining treatment as any procedure or intervention which utilizes me-
chanical or artificial means to sustain, restore or supplant vital functions, however, nu-
trition and hydration is only defined as life sustaining treatment if it serves to postpone
death); see also Elizabeth Helene Adamson, The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical
Treatment and the Noncompetent Nonterminally Ill Patient: An Analysis of Abridgment
and Anarchy, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 470 (1990) (stating that most life sustaining proce-
dures serve to delay moment of death by excluding medication or procedure to alleviate
pain).
30 See The Right to Die, supra note 27, at 511 (contending that because of Equal Pro-
tection Clause there is no reason why non-terminally ill person who made voluntary, in-
formed decision to die, should be denied right to have assistance to achieve death).
31 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (stating "[a] seriously ill or
dying patient whose wishes are not honored may feel captive of the machinery required
for life sustaining measures or other medical interventions. Such forced treatment may
burden that individual's liberty interests as much as any state concern..."); see also
Nancy Watkins Anderson, Life and Death in Washington State After Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 249, 317 n.264 (1992)
(arguing that allowing physicians to refuse to take patient off life sustaining treatment
makes patient prisoner to technological advances).
32 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 (describing decision to withdraw life support is
"deeply personal" decision which is protected by Due Process Clause); see also Alan
Meisel, The Debate Is Not Over, Supreme Court's Ruling Just Puts Question Back to
Court of Public Opinion, PORT. OREGONIAN, June 27, 1997, at B09 (asserting that deci-
sion of terminally ill patients to forgo life sustaining treatments is private, intimate de-
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A failure to comply with the request for physician-assisted
suicide, on the other hand, would restrict patient autonomy, but
would not amount to a bodily invasion. 33 The cases of Compas-
sion in Dying34 and Quill 35 once again call upon the United
States Supreme Court to address the limits of governmental
power and the scope of individual autonomy.
There is another blurring of the distinction between physician-
assisted suicide and the potential double effect of pain medica-
tion in certain circumstances. 36 The term "double effect" refers
to the administration of pain medication with the intention of
providing relief from suffering, with the possible secondary effect
of hastening death.37
It is important to understand that hastening of death is theo-
retical. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether the dis-
ease or the medication is responsible for the precise moment of
death.38 There is widespread consensus, among ethicists and
cision to be made by patient without governmental interference).
33 See Tom L. Beauchamp, The Justification of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 29 IND. L.
REv. 1173, 1188-91 (1996) (analogizing physician's refusal to assist in suicide to refusal to
prescribe requested narcotics where physicians feel it is inappropriate); see also The
Right to Die, supra note 27, at 492 (stating that to deny patient's request for physician-
assisted suicide will certainly restrict patient's self determination but it does not amount
to bodily invasion or medical imprisonment).
34 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
35 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct 2293 (1997).
36 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 823-24 (arguing that there is little difference for con-
stitutional or ethical purposes between providing medication with double effect and pro-
viding medication for single effect because both hasten death); The Right to Die, supra
note 27, at 485 (contending that court in Compassion in Dying belittled distinction be-
tween physician-assisted suicide and double effect of medication); see also Leon R. Kass
& Nelson Lund, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Medical Ethics and the Future of the Medical
Profession, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 395, 422-423 (1996) (contending that double effect has
blurred distinction between physician-assisted suicide and double effect of medication).
37 See Susan R. Martyn & Henry Bourguignon, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Lethal
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 399 (1997) (stating
that double effect phenomenon differs from physician-assisted suicide in that the former
supports the patient's life while recognizing that treatment or medication necessary to re-
lieve suffering risks hastening death of patient while latter relieves suffering by ending the
patient's life); see also Derrick Augustus Carter, Knight in the Duel with Death: Physician-
Assisted Suicide and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 VILL. L. REV. 663, 719 (1996) (stating
that "aggressive medical treatment that has the double effect of alleviating pain as well as
the collateral effect of causing death"); Peter G. Daniels, An Illinois Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide Act: A Merciful End to a Terminally Ill Criminal Tradition, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 763,
767-68 (1997) (stating that physicians' participation in double effect results from the belief
that sometimes the obligation to alleviate suffering surpasses the unnatural prolonging of
life).
38 See Carter, supra note 37, at 699 (contending that basic premise of double effect
theory is that disease kills not the medication); see also Lance K. Stell, Stopping Treat-
ment on Grounds of Futility: A Role for Institutional Policy, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
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within the law, that the double effect is a morally acceptable risk
in the context of the great suffering of the terminally-ill. 39 In
addition, we do have technology available for managing pain and
other symptoms associated with terminal illness. 40
One of the big concerns is that such technology is not routinely
provided.4 1 For example, even though we have a wonderful
hospice program, only about 15% of the terminally ill are actu-
ally made part of the hospice program. That phenomenon is due
to a number of different factors. 42
It is important to note, in light of similar language in the
Ninth Circuit, 43 that it is a misconception that severe discomfort
is invariably associated with the final stages of a terminal ill-
ness. 44 Pain and other physical symptoms, in most circum-
481, 497 (1992) (stating that "any medical intervention has reasonably expectable death-
postponing effect," so this medical intervention "almost totally eclipses natural course of
disease").
39 See Carter, supra note 37, at 719 (referring to Minnesota's statute that bans as-
sisted suicide but permits, along with Catholic Church, exemption for administration of
medication to relieve another person's pain or suffering); see also Robert A. Sedler, Are
Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide Constitutional? I Say No, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
725, 729 (1995) (stating that since government has no valid interest in prolonging death,
terminally ill people continue to suffer).
40 See Robert A. Burt, Constitutionalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide: Will Lighten-
ing Strike Thrice?, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 159, 181 (1996) (stating that pain management has
recently improved both through development of better techniques and enhanced care de-
livery of hospice); see also Edward R. Grant & Paul Benjamin Linton, Relief or Reproach?
Euthanasia Rights in the Wake of Measure 16, 74 OR. L. REV. 449, 537 n.306 (1995)
(contending that advances in pain management have made cases of intolerable, untreat-
able pain rare).
41 See Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 11, at 769 (asserting that high cost of
pain management makes its availability limited to small number of patients with ade-
quate health insurance); see also Susan Block & Andrew Billings, Patients Requests to
Hasten Death: Evaluation and Management in Terminal Care, 154 ARCH. INTERN. MED.
2039, 2040 (1994) (stating that other symptoms of terminal illness are often inadequately
controlled by physicians who lack expertise in palliative care or fail to take aggressive
position toward assuring patient's comfort); see generally Burt, supra note 40, at 181
(contending that doctors do not inform patients about pain alleviation or provide pallia-
tive care).
42 See, e.g., Joanne Lynn et al., Defining the 'Terminally Ill" Insights From Support,
35 DuQ. L. REV. 311, 312-14 (1996) (noting that Medicare hospice benefits only extend to
patients that are deemed to only have life expectancy not exceeding six months).
43 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 818 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
44 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 818 (discussing belief that patients who are terminally
ill may be subjected to unnecessary pain and discomfort when their lives are mechani-
cally extended with no medical benefits in return); see also Carter, supra note 37, at 718
(noting that doctors say that terminally ill patients, dying of lack of nutrition, do not suf-
fer in stereotypical image of parched person scrambling in desert for water); Undying
Pain: Relieving Death's Pain Will Reduce Calls for Help to Die, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Jan. 19, 1997, at 2 (stating that many people drift into final sleep without significant dis-
comfort).
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stances, can be appropriately controlled within the confines of
standard medical practice. 45 Although potent medications can
sometimes reduce alertness, there are psychostimulant medica-
tions that are available that might ameliorate this problem.
46
There are misconceptions both by the public and professionals
about the management of pain, in addition to pain and suffer-
ing.47 Such misconceptions distort the current debate about
physician-assisted suicide. Most individuals with terminal ill-
ness do not have to experience undue suffering. 48 The Ninth
Circuit's opinion reflected the prevailing feeling, by both the
public and professionals, that extreme pain and physical symp-
toms are inevitably associated with terminal illness. 49 Public
education and continuing debate are critical to dispelling these
misconceptions. In addition, enhanced professional education is
certainly necessary to ensure that competent pain management
is available and accessible to all individuals.
One of the criteria for physician-assisted suicide is that the
individual be terminal. 50 There has been much discussion by
reasonable minds who differ as to whether or not one can accu-
rately predict whether an individual is terminal.
51
45 See Grant & Linton, supra note 40, at 537 n.306 (noting that improvements in
pain control have made cases of intolerable, untreatable pain rare); see generally Nancy
J. Osgood, Assisted Suicide & Older People-A Deadly Combination: Ethical Problems in
Permitting Assisted Suicide, 10 ISSUE L. & MED. 415, 428 (1995) (discussing terminally ill
patients and availability of palliative care).
46 See Abstracts, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 459, 462 (1996) (detailing use of psychostimu-
lant drugs for controlling depression, as well as sedation, in terminally ill patients).
47 See Burt, supra note 40, at 166. Medical technology exists that will provide relief
for terminally ill patients suffering from excruciating pain. Id. Often times, however,
physicians neither utilize such measures nor discuss such techniques with their patients.
Id. Moreover, this technology is sometimes not prescribed to those patients in need due
to physicians' insufficient knowledge concerning pain management and state and federal
restrictions on availability of controlled substances. Id. at 167.
48 See, e.g., A Growing Move to Treat Chronic Pain Seriously, USA TODAY, Apr. 16,
1997, at 6D (noting that with the proper treatment, terminally ill patients' pain can be
controlled).
49 See Compassion, 79 F.3d at 818 (noting Washington legislature's recognition that
those terminal patients dependent on life sustaining medical technology experience ex-
treme pain when their lives are extended by such means).
53 See id. (noting that holding in Compassion would limit right to physician-assisted
suicide to terminally ill competent adults); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1996)
(discussing physician-assisted suicide in limited context of terminally ill person's rights),
rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
51 See Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide: Creating A Regulatory Potemkim Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (1996)
(discussing difficulty of finding consistent definition of "terminal condition"); Stephen L.
Mikachik, Assisted Suicide and Disabled People, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 987, 987 (1997)
(referring to ABA Commission on Legal Problems' notion that term "terminal" is without
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I can tell from my personal experience, with Choice in Dying
and with nursing homes, hospitals and physicians, that there is
profound disagreement among professionals and others concern-
ing whether an individual meets a certain definition of terminal
illness. This is evident by the fact that the word "terminal" is
described in different ways in various statutes. 52
The advanced directive statutes illustrate that there are at
least seven different commonly used definitions of terminal ill-
nesses. As a result, defining terminal illness might not be as
easy as it initially seems. 53
Lastly, one of the cornerstones of the regulation of physician-
assisted suicide is to ensure that physicians and their patients
communicate clearly regarding not only physician-assisted sui-
cide, but all of their treatment choices. 54 Choice in Dying's ex-
perience, as well as mine, indicates that, at least in the area of
withholding life sustaining treatment, patients frequently re-
ceive unwanted medical treatments that prolong their lives. 55
Such conflict often continues between providers and patients. In
fact, from the last report that we did, among the 922 case calls
received during a 30 month period at Choice in Dying, sixty-five
percent of such calls involved concerns over unwanted treat-
truly operational definition).
52 See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-172 (1983) (stating that therapeutic intervention is no
longer appropriate if patient's medical prognosis is one with life expectancy of six months
or less); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5653 (West 1997) (describing terminal illness as condi-
tion in which a patient's death is anticipated within six months); MINN. STAT. § 62A.616
(1996) (interpreting terminal illness to be diagnosis certified by physician that person has
less than six months to live); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-403 (1993) (defining terminal illness
as incurable, irreversible condition that without life sustaining system, will cause death
within relatively short time); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2-96 (West 1996) (stating that termi-
nal illness is defined as illness for which there is unknown cure, which ultimately ends in
death, and is certified as such by two physicians licensed to practice medicine and sur-
gery); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.3 (West 1996) (stating that terminal illness means in-
curable, irreversible condition that even with administration of life-sustaining treatment,
will in attending physician's, in addition to another physician's, opinion result in death
within six months); WIS. STAT. § 50.90 (1993) (defining terminal illness as medical prog-
nosis that individual's life expectancy is less than twelve months).
53 See Coleson, supra note 4, at 60-63 (exploring three approaches to defining
"terminally ill": (1) subjective determination; (2) statistical determination; and (3) disease
threshold).
54 See Donald E. Spencer, Practical Implications for Healthcare Providers in a Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide Environment, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 545, 554 (1995) (explaining
importance of physician/patient communication).
55 See Donald C. Dilworth, Dying Wishes Are Ignored By Hospitals, Doctors, TRIAL,
Feb. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13323062 (noting that many times physicians ignore
patients' wishes not to be kept alive with life sustaining procedures, resulting in prolon-
gation of patients suffering through receipt of unwanted medical treatment).
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ment. Seventy-four percent of those instances involved a dis-
pute, usually between the patient or the patient's family and the
healthcare provider, over the use of life sustaining treatment.
Choice in Dying and I are concerned that this lack of communi-
cation, reflected in the withholding or withdrawal of life sustain-
ing treatment, will carry over into any discussion between the
healthcare provider and the patient regarding physician-assisted
suicide.
The above concerns need to be addressed and they need to be
part of this continuous public debate. In fact, one of the reasons
that we are all here today is to ensure that this essential public
debate continues.
Thank you.
